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Labour market friction is viewed as the Tobin’s Q of an employed worker as opposed to the position of the 
Beveridge curve.   This Tobin’s Q is inversely proportional to the average quality of the match between 
employers and workers.   Based on this measure, I find that the labour market friction has a procyclical  
trend in the US, which is indicative of the fact that firms compromise on the quality of the skill match 
during an expansion.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The relative price of investment to consumer goods has significantly declined over time in 
the US.   This decline is particularly noticeable in the 80s, which coincided with the great 
period of moderation of output volatility.  A number of papers ascribe this recent decline 
to elimination of investment frictions (Justiniano and Primiceri, 2006, Chari, Kehoe and 
Mcgrattan, 2005).   Although there is a near consensus that the degree of capital market 
frictions in the US has substantially decreased recently, less is known about labour market 
frictions.    
Following the work of   Pissariades (1985), by labour market friction I mean the 
degree of mismatch between the worker and the employer.  Little is known about this job-
matching variable at the aggregate level.   A sizable literature focuses on the behaviour of 
the unemployment-vacancy relationship (known as the Beveridge curve) as a measure of 
this friction.   There are both empirical and theoretical limitations of this Beverdige curve 
approach.  Vacancy is usually measured by the help-wanted index which is less reliable  
particularly after the internet revolution when job openings are mostly available online.  
Valletta (2005) attempts to remedy this deficiency by creating a synthetic job vacancy 
ratio and argues that the Beveridge curve has shifted inward in the 80s after an outward 
shift  in  the  70s.      Shimer  (2005)  argues  that  the  vacancy-unemployment  ratio  has  a 
remarkable volatility (almost 20 times higher than the labour productivity).  This volatility 
makes it difficult to arrive at a definitive conclusion about the time path of the labour 
market frictions. 
2    
Theoretically,  it  may  be  misleading  to  use  unemployment-vacancy  ratio  as  a 
measure of labour market frictions even though it is measured with reasonable accuracy. 
During an expansionary phase of the cycle the unemployment-vacancy ratio may decline 
because firms may be keen on filling vacancies in a tight labour market even though the 
match is poor.
3  Thus the skill match might progressively deteriorate as the labour market 
tightens.  To explore this issue further I use a price-based approach to measure the quality 
of the skill match.  A firm’s decision to fill a job vacancy is considered as an investment 
                                                 
2 Hornstein et al. (2005) extend Shimer’s (2005) work and find additional problems in replicating the 
observed unemployment-vacancy fluctuations using the extant matching models.   
3 Abraham and Katz (1986) argue that a downward sloping unemployment-vacancy relationship postulated 
by a Beveridge curve is not consistent when unemployment is driven by job separations.   3
problem.   Just like the law of motion of the physical capital, the representative firm takes 
a dynamic Beveridge curve as given and then makes optimal choices about the time paths 
of employment as well as physical capital. The relative price of a worker with respect to  
capital is shown to be the Tobin’s Q of an employed worker.  I show that this Tobin’s Q is 
inversely related to the average match quality of the worker and the employer. The Q of 
the  worker  shows  endogenous  fluctuations  driven  by  the  TFP  shock.    Parallel  to 
investment friction, in my model, more frictions in the labour market means a higher 
Tobin’s Q of the existing worker.    Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) define labour 
market friction in terms of an implicit tax on wages.  My model differs from Chari et al. 
(2005)  in  an  important  dimension.    While  in  their  model  the  labour  wedge  in  a  real 
prototype model is equivalent to stickiness of nominal wages, in my model, this labour 
wedge is explicitly identified with the quality of the match between  workers and the 
employers. 
I employ a production based asset-pricing model drawing on the work of Merz and 
Yashiv (2005) and Cochrane (1991).   Using a calibrated version of this model, I argue 
that there is a rising trend in the labour market friction in the US economy during the 
post-war period which accords well with the observed behaviour of the relative price of 
labour.  The model predicts that the labour market friction represented by this Tobin’s Q 
measure  shows  a  procyclical  movement.    This  is  indicative  of  the  fact  that  firms 
compromise on the match quality in hiring new employees in a booming economy when 
the labour market is tight.    
The  plan  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.    In  the  following  section,  I  report  some 
stylized facts about the time series behaviour of the relative price of labour in terms of 
capital. In section 3, a production-based asset-pricing model is laid out to show the precise 
relationship between the labour market friction and the value of a worker.  Section 4 
reports some calibration results. Section 5 concludes.   
 
 
2. Capital and Labour Market Frictions: Some Stylized Facts 
Chari et al. (2005) interpret the input market friction in terms of the relative price 
of the relevant input.  Based on this measure, a decline in the relative price of investment   4
goods with respect to consumption goods means a decline in investment frictions.   In 
Figure 1, I plot the ratio of US producer price index of finished capital goods to the 
consumer price index.   Following the oil shock in the early 70s, there is a steady decline 
in this relative price of investment goods, which reconfirms the decrease in capital market 
frictions in the 80s.         
<Figure 1 comes here> 
Motivated by this price-based measure of input frictions, I calculate the relative 
price of labour with respect to capital for the US economy over the period 1948-2001 to 
arrive at a measure of labour market friction.  This relative price is measured by the ratio 
of the annual index of compensation per worker to the producer price index of finished 
capital goods over the period 1948-2001 taking 1992 as the base year.  Data for 
compensation per worker came from Hall (2001) who compiled these data from Bureau of 
Labour Statistics (BLS).  The producer price index of finished capital goods came from 
the Federal Reserve St Louis database.  Figure 2 plots the series. The relative price of a 
worker shows a steady increase except for the period of the oil shocks during 1973-74 
when all producer prices increased.   
<Figure 2 comes here> 
Figure 3 plots the cyclical components of GDP and the relative price of worker.  
The cyclical component is measured by the percent deviation from the Hodrick-Prescott 
trend.   The value of worker is procyclical. The correlation coefficient between the 
cyclical components is 0.50.
4  
 
<Figure 3 comes here> 
 
  In the rest of the paper, I will argue that this procyclical trend in the relative value 
of labour with respect to capital is driven by a decrease in the average quality of the match 
between workers and the employers during an expansion.  As the labour market becomes 
tighter in an expansionary phase of the cycle, firms start compromising on the quality of 
the match while recruiting. This makes already employed workers more valuable to the 
                                                 
4 This procyclical movement in the value of the worker is consistent with the stylized fact that the real wage 
is procyclical in nature.  The correlation coefficient between the cyclical component of the real wage 
(deflated by CPI ) and the GDP cycle is  0.47.    5
firm.    Based on this analysis, I will argue that the relative value of worker with respect to 
tangible  capital  is  a  reasonable  measure  of  labour  market  friction  as  opposed  to 
unemployment-vacancy ratio.  To make this point transparent, in the next section, I focus 
on the production sector of the economy and develop a simple asset-pricing model.  
 
3. The Model 
I  propose  a  production-based  asset-pricing  model,  which  builds  on  Merz  and  Yashiv 
(2005).
5   The production sector consists of identical firms sharing the same production 
and investment technology facing a market wage rate, wt whose time path is exogenously 
specified.  The timeline is as follows.  At the start of date t, the firm observes a TFP shock 
t e   and  produces  output  with  the  predetermined  tangible  capital  Kt  and  the  human 
resources Nt using the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 




t t t t N K Y               (1) 
 
where a  is the capital share in output.   The firm then disburses the existing employees a 
real wage of wt.  Finally it undertakes two types of investment decisions: investment in 
tangible capital It  and  posting of new vacancy, Vt.  The cost of posting new vacancy, Xt is 
proportional to the number of posting as follows:  
t t aV X = ;       with  0 > a             (2)     
 Investment in tangible capital augments firm’s the physical capital following a standard 
linear depreciation rule:  
t t t I K K + - = + ) 1 ( 1 d               (3) 
where d is the constant rate of depreciation of physical capital.    
Regarding the latter investment, I follow Merz and Yashiv (2005), to postulate the 
following law of motion for the employees:  
t t t t V q N N + - = + ) 1 ( 1 y           (4)   
where  ) 1 , 0 ( Î y  is an exogenous job destruction rate, and qt is the average match quality 
between  the  workers  and  the  employers.  One  may  think  of  this  law  of  motion  as  a 
                                                 
5 Merz and Yashiv (2005) use a production based asset-pricing model of the type pioneered by Cochrane 
(1991).  Their innovation is to show that the market value of a firm can be decomposed into the value of 
capital and the value of labour.         6
dynamic Beveridge curve in an employment-vacancy plane.
6  The higher the qt, the lesser 
the friction in the labour market which means that the increase in employment will be 
higher for a given number of vacancies making investment in human capital a cheaper 
option to the firm compared to physical capital.  As we will see later that qt is endogenous 
in this model and determined by the firm’s valuation of a worker, which in turn depends 
on economic fundamentals.                
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s.t.    (1) through (4) , given K0 , N0.          
 
The TFP shock  t e is specified as a geometric random walk as follows:
8  
1 1 ln ln + + + = t t t x e e                         (5) 
where  1 + t x ~N(0, 2 s ) 
 
 The first order conditions with respect to I and X are as follows:  
I:   [ ] d a e r a - + = -
+ + 1 1 1
1 1 t t t k E               (6) 
V:   ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ 1
1 1 1 1
1 -
+ + + +
- - + - - = t t t t t t aq w k E aq y a e r a              (7) 
 
                                                 
6 To see it clearly, normalize the labour force at unity (ignore population growth). Then (3) can be rewritten 
in an unemployment-vacancy plane as:  t V t q t U t U - - + = + ) 1 ( 1 y y  where  t U  defined as 1-Nt is the rate 
of unemployment and Vt is the vacancy rate.  This is a familiar dynamic Beveridge curve used in the 
literature (see for example, Nickell et al, 2001).   
7 I ignore any convex adjustment cost in this benchmark model. There is, however, some built in 
adjustment cost of shifting resources from tangible to intangible capital.  The firm incurs a relative price of 
1/qt to switch from tangible to intangible investment.  
8 According to  Prescott (1986) US TFP is a near random walk process while I assume that it is an exact 
random walk.  Benaerjee and Magnus (2001) show that the forecast sensitivity due to difference stationary 
specification when the process is truly trend stationary is of first order insignificance. See also Banerjee and 
Basu (2001) for a related paper.  Moreover, I also performed a unit root test for the logarithm of the TFP 
series used in the following section.  One cannot reject the null of a unit root.       7
where kt is the capital/employment ratio at date t. Given the random walk nature of the 
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The first order conditions (6) and (7) can be rewritten in the following valuation 
equation form:  
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V 1 + =                  (14)   
The Tobin’s Q of capital is unity while the Tobin’s Q of a worker is the inverse of the 
average match quality qt.  This match quality variable qt drives a wedge between the 
Tobin’s Q of capital and the Tobin’s Q of labour.  The relative value of a worker is 
defined as the Tobin’s Q of a worker to the Tobin’s Q of tangible capital. This relative   8
value is the inverse of the match quality qt.   A higher relative value of a worker thus 
reflects a lower match quality or a greater degree of labour market friction.





.  Using (4) and (7), one can write the following valuation equation 
for a worker: 
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This valuation equation is just like a standard asset pricing equation. The worker is valued 
as an intangible asset to the firm. The Tobin’s Q of an installed worker is typically the 
expected  present  value  of  cash  flows  or  surplus  arising  from  his/her  continued 
employment.   This cash flow is the difference between worker’s productivity the real 
wage.    
 
Specification of the Process for Wages 
 
There are two alternative views of the real wage story: (i) sticky wage version, (ii) flexible 
wage version.  Hall (2005) provides a comprehensive survey of this debate and arrives at 
a synthesis. As far as the US labour market is concerned, the punchline of this debate 
boils down to the link between real wage and productivity.   To nest these alternative 
views of the real wage formation, I posit the following process for real wage:   
[ ] q
t t MPL w W =                (16) 
where the parameter  ) 1 , 0 ( Î q captures the elasticity of real wage with respect to the 
contemporaneous marginal product of labour and Wis a scale parameter.   A zero value of 






                                                 
9 To see why the relative price of physical capital is qt, note from (2) and 3) that the firm has to invest 1/qt 
to augment the number of employees by one unit.    9
Solution for the Tobin’s Q of Worker 
 
 The key equation is (15) which involves the Tobin’s Q of the worker. Using the method 
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The appendix outlines the derivation of (17).   The Tobin’s Q of a worker is basically 
driven by the TFP.  Whether a positive TFP shock increases or decreases the Tobin’s Q 
depends  on  the  how  the  TFP  impacts  the  revenue  and  cost  of  the  firm.    If  revenue 
increases more than the cost, the currently employed worker will be valued more by the 
firm.  Another way to look at this is that a higher valuation attached to the currently 
employed worker means a higher demand for labour in a tighter labour market.  The 
equilibrium  match  quality  qt  must  be  lower  in  a  tighter  labour  market  to  make  the 
employed worker more worthwhile.  
 
   10




There are five parameters: a , d , , r  y , 2 s .  Following Prescott (1986) I set the 
benchmark values, a = .36, and d =0.1 (annual data),  96 . = r  and  2 s  is fixed at .00763. 
There is no published estimate of the parameter y . The closest one is the average job 
separation rate of 3% in the US economy over the period 1946-2001 found in Hall (2001).   
The remaining parameters are  q  and Win (16).   These parameters were identified at 
values equal to .62 and 1 respectively by running a loglinear regression of real wage index 
on a moving average of the TFP indices.
10    
 
Data  
I use the annual manufacturing multifactor productivity index as a proxy for the overall 
TFP of the US economy.  The data came from the Bureau of Labour Statistics. The real 
wage series was constructed by deflating the compensation per worker by the CPI. The 
data series again came from Hall (2001).   The sample period ranges from 1949 to 2001.   
 
Trend and Cyclical Components of the Labour Market Frictions  
 
Using the baseline parameter values and the observed series for the TFP,  I next compute 
the series for the Tobin’s Q of worker  based on equation (17).  Figure 3 plots the model 
and actual Tobin’s Q of a worker over the entire sample period. The actual Q is the same 
series reported in Figure 1. The model series is normalized at unity for the base year 1992 
to make it comparable to the actual relative price of labour.   The model performs really 
well in tracking down the trend in the Tobin’s Q of the worker.   
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a a k .  Setting  36 . = a , I 
obtain an estimate of q equal to .62, which was significant at 1% level. The constant coefficient was found 
statistically insignificant.  Given that the structural parameters a   r  and d  cannot be zero, I take the 
insignificant k as an evidence that W is close to unity. The R
2 for this real wage regression was .96.    This 
real wage regression simply reconfirms the procyclical behaviour of the US real wage of worker.      11
<Figure 4 comes here> 
Figure 5 plots the cyclical components of the model’s Tobin’s Q of a worker and 
the cyclical component of GDP.  The model’s Tobin’s Q show procyclical fluctuations. 
The correlation coefficient is 0.82.
11   This is reconfirmed in Table 1 which presents the 
cross correlation between the cyclical components of GDP, model Tobin’s Q and actual 
Tobin’s Q.   
<Figure 5 and Table 1 come here> 
 
This quantitative exercise based on the model’s Tobin’s Q equation suggests that 
the average quality of the match deteriorates during an expansion when unemployment is 
lower.    This  match  quality  is  determined  in  equilibrium  by  firms’  valuation  of  the 
installed worker, which is the Tobin’s Q of the worker.  The intuition for a higher Tobin’s 
Q of a worker during an expansionary phase goes as follows.  A positive TFP shock at 
date t triggers an increase in capital-employment ratio (kt+1) in the following period (see 
equation 8).   Due to the constant returns to scale property of the production function, a 
higher kt+1 lowers the marginal product of capital at date t+1, and raises the marginal 
product of  a worker.    Thus a higher TFP realization today basically  signals a higher 
prospective relative return to human capital with respect to physical capital.  In response 
to this, firms switch gear from physical investment to investment in human capital, which 
means posting more vacancy (higher Vt).  This increased demand for workers raises the 
value  of  the  worker  meaning  lower  match  quality  qt.    Thus  in  equilibrium  a  lower 
unemployment coexists with a lower match quality. Basically firms compromise on the 
quality of the match during a boom when the labour market is tight.  
    
An Estimate of the Match Probability  
In this section, I estimate the match probability qt based on the model’s Tobin’s Q of the 
worker.  I normalize this probability by setting a value of the job posting cost parameter a 
in equation (2) such that maximum value of qt equals unity. This means a equals .53.  
                                                 
11 Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) measure labour frictions, which they call labour wedge, in terms of 
an implicit tax on wages.  Their labour wedge also covaries positively with output although for reasons 
fundamentally different from my model.  The labour wedge in their model is equivalent to stickiness of 
wages while in my model the labour wedge is equivalent to a matching friction.     12
Since this matching probability is a stationary variable, I detrend the model Tobin’s Q by 
taking  out  a  log-linear  trend  component  out  of  it.      Figure  6  plots  this  matching 
probability and the detrended TFP series.
12   
<Figure 6 comes here> 
One may note that the matching probability declined during the 70s and then it revived in 
the  80s  while  TFP  shows  the  opposing  pattern.    The  matching  probability  increased 
during  the  80s  when  there  was  productivity  slowdown.    These  results  reinforce  my 
hypothesis that the quality of the match shows a countercyclical pattern.   
 Note that qt determines the shift of the Beveridge curve (see footnote 5).   Our 
results thus also accord well with  Valletta (2005) who finds that the US Beveridge curve 
shifted out during the 70s and then shifted back in during the 80s.  In the present setting, 
the slope of the Beveridge curve is endogenously driven by the TFP.  My framework 
shows the direct link between the TFP and the matching probability which is inversely 
related to labour market frictions.  The reversal of the match probability labour market 
frictions is basically driven by the reversal in the TFP movements in the US economy in 
the 80s.   
 
General equilibrium 
In this paper, I have posed the issue of labour market friction and the related Tobin’s Q of 
worker from a partial equilibrium angle. I  only look at the firm’s side of the problem. In a 
general equilibrium, the average quality of the match (the inverse of the Tobin’s Q of the 
worker) is determined by the interaction between firm’s search for the right employee and 
the household’s search for the right match.  In the appendix, I outline a general 
equilibrium version of the model following Merz (1995) and argue that the procyclical 
behavior of the labour market friction is theoretically robust.  The search friction is 
modeled as a social planning problem where the planner internalizes both advertisement 
cost and search cost.  A positive TFP shock triggers a wealth effect, which means more 
vacancy posting by the firms and more search efforts by the households.  Due to 
convexity of the search cost function, this means a lower match quality between workers 
and the employees.  
                                                 
12 The TFP series is also normalized at unity taking 1992 as the base year.    13
 
5. Conclusion 
There is no consensus whether the labour market friction has increased or decreased in the 
US economy over the last few decades.  The traditional literature identifies labour market 
friction in terms of an upward shift of the Beveridge curve.  In this paper, I question this 
interpretation of the labour market friction. I take an asset pricing approach to understand 
the friction. Higher friction means a lower match quality, which implies a higher relative 
value of a worker with respect to capital.  Viewed from this perspective, I find that the 
labour market friction has a procyclical pattern.  The increased friction is reflected by a 
lower  match  quality  during  an  expansion.    This  basically  indicates  that  firms  find  it 
difficult to have the right match in an expansionary economy with a tighter labour market.    
Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no conflict between a higher labour market 
friction and lower unemployment.             14
 
Appendix A 
Derivation of equation 15 
Conjecture a solution  
) 1 /(
2
) 1 /( 1
1
1 a q a e l e l - - - - = t t t q               (A.1) 
Upon substitution in  (4) and using the geometric lognormal random property of the TFP 
process  } { t e   one obtains: 
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Using the method of undetermined coefficients it immediately follows that  
















which proves (15). // 
 
Appendix B 
Tobin’s Q of a Worker in General Equilibrium 
I consider a social planning problem based on Merz (1995) as follows. The social planner 
chooses consumption (Ct), employment (Nt), unemployment (1-Nt), search intensity (St) 
and job vacancies (Vt)  posted per firm to solve the following maximization problem:  
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t t t t t t Y aV N S c I C = + - + + ) 1 )( (  : Resource constraint    (A.1)   15
 
) , ( t t t t N K F Y e =   :   Production function      (A.2) 
 
t I t K t K + - = + ) 1 ( 1 d : Law of motion of physical capital  (A.3)   
 
t M t N t N + - = + ) 1 ( 1 y : Law of Motion of Employment   (A.4) 
 
[ ]l l ) 1 ( 1
t N t S t V t M - - =  ,  1 0 < < l :  Matching Function   (A.5) 
 
K0, N0 = given             (A.6) 
 
All the notations are the same as before except St and Mt which stand for household’s 
search  intensity  and  the  extent  of  matching  between  workers  and  firms.  The  cost  of 
worker’s search is represented by the function  ) ( t S c  which satisfies the properties that 
0 ) ( ' > t S c  and  . 0 ) ( ' ' > t S c   The social planner internalizes both these  costs which explains 
the resource constraint (A.1) facing the planner. Equation (A.5) represents a standard 
Pissarides (1985) type matching technology, which means that the quality of the match 
between employers and the workers depends on the interaction between search intensities 
of  firms  and  workers.    The  social  planner  instantaneous  felicity  function  represents  
household’s utility function of consumption, U(Ct),  and disutility function of work, V(Nt).  
  
Our central concern here is about the Tobin’s Q of the worker which is the inverse 





1                (A.7) 
 
It is straightforward to verify that a key first order condition must hold equating the ratio 
of  marginal  products  of  search  and  advertisements  to  the  ratio  of  the  corresponding 
marginal costs. In other words, at the optimum we must have:  
a
t N t S c
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Given the convexity of the search cost function, the Tobin’s Q of the worker positively 
correlates with worker’s search intensity.  Following Merz (1995), one can argue that a 
positive  technology  shock  via  a  positive  resource  wealth  effect  creates  congestion  by 
raising the search intensity (St) of workers. This raises the Tobin’s Q of worker in a 
general equilibrium.      17
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Figure 3: Plot of the Cyclical Components of the Relative Price 
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Table 1: Correlation between the Cyclical Components of GDP,  
Model’s Value of Worker, Actual Value of Worker   
  GDP  Model q
-1  Actual q
-1 
GDP  1  .82  .50 
Model q
-1   .82  1  .37 
Actual q
-1 













Abraham, K.G  and L.F. Katz (1986), “Cyclical Unemployment:Sectoral Shifts or 
Aggregate Disturbances?” Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), pp. 507-22. 
 
Banerjee, A.N (2001), “Sensitivity of Univariate AR(1) Time-series Forecasts near the 
Unit Root”, Journal of Forecasting, Vol 20 Issue 3, pp. 203-229.  
  
Banerjee, A.N. and P. Basu (2001), “A Re-examination of Excess Sensitivity Puzzle when 
Consumers Forecast the Income Process”, Journal of Forecasting, Vol 20 Issue 5, pp. 357-
356.  
 
Chari V, P.J. Kehoe and E. McGrattan (2005), “Business Cycle Accounting,” Federal 
Reserve bank of Minneapolis, Research Staff Report, 328. 
 
Cochrane, J.H.  (1991), “Production Based Asset Pricing and the Link between Stock 
Returns and Economic Fluctuations,” Journal of Finance, 147:207-234.   
Hall. 
 
Hall, R.E. (2005), “Job Loss, Job Finding and Unemployment in the past Fifty Years,” 
NBER Macroeconomics Annual, pp. 101-137.  
 
Hornstein, A, P. Krusell and G. L. Violante (2005), “Unemployment and Vacancy 
Fluctuations in the Matching Model: Inspecting the Mechanism,”  Economic Quarterly, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 91, 3:pp.19-51.   
  
Justiniano, A and G.E. Primiceri  (2006), “Time Varying Volatility of Macroeconomic 
Fluctuations,” Working paper. 
 
Merz, M (1995), “Search in the Labour  Market and the Real Business Cycle,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 36: 269-300. 
  
Merz, M and E. Yashiv (2005), “Labour and the Market Value of the Firm,” University of 
Bonn, Reproduced.   
 
Nickell, S, l. Nunziata, W. Ochel and G. Quintini, “The Beveridge Curve, Unemployment 
and Wages in the OECD from 1960s to the 1990s, in Aghion, et al. Knowledge and 
Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics, Princeton University press.    
   
Pissarides, C.A. (1985), “Short run Dynamics  of Unemployment, Vacancies and Real 
Wages,” American Economic Review, 75:676-690.  
 
Prescott. E.C. (1986), “Theory Ahead of Measurement,”  10(4): 1-15. 
   22
Shimer,  R  (2005),  “The  Cyclical  Behavior  of  Equilibrium  Unemployment  and 
Vacancies,” American Economic Review, 95(1): 25-49.   
 
Valletta, R.G. (2005), “Why has the US Beveridge Curve Shifted Back? New Evidence 
Using Regional Data,”   Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Reproduced.    